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61. INTRODUCTION
Strict control of State aid is essential for the proper functioning of the Internal Market. In
recent years the Commission has significantly tightened State aid control, thus ensuring
that Member States only award aid that really serves the common interest. Yet the annual
level of overall aid in the EU was still more than 79 Billion Euro in 1999. Whilst each
individual grant of aid is awarded under conditions accepted by the Commission, it is
undeniable that the cumulative effect of all the aid has a considerable distortive effect on
competition in the Internal Market.
This is recognised by Member States and the European Parliament. In 1996 the Dublin
European Council1 concluded that European competitiveness should be advanced by,
inter alia, continuing the dialogue between Council and Commission in order to improve
the effectiveness of State aid control and to reinforce control mechanisms. In 1998 the
Cardiff European Council2 further emphasised the need to promote competition and to
reduce distortions such as State aid. Early last year, the Internal Market Council3, in its
conclusions on the Cardiff economic reform process, called for strategies to be developed
for an overall reduction in State aid and stressed the importance of monitoring its level
and evaluation of its economic effects, notably through statistical data. The Lisbon
European Council in March 20004 once again reiterated its commitment to promote
competition and called upon Member States to reduce the general level of State aid and
shift the emphasis from supporting individual companies or sectors towards tackling
horizontal objectives of Community interest, such as employment, regional development,
environment and training or research. The Commission, in its Recommendations for the
2000 Broad Economic Policy Guidelines5, has also stressed the importance of reducing
the volume of State aid. It recommended that Member States make additional efforts to
avoid sector specific and especially ad hoc State aid. In March this year, the Stockholm
European Council6 asked Member States to demonstrate a downward trend in State aid
in relation to GDP by 2003, taking into account the need to redirect aid towards
horizontal objectives of common interest, including cohesion objectives. For the first time
therefore, an objective indicator was introduced against which Member States could
measure their performance. In order to improve transparency in the field of State aid the
Commission was asked to ensure the provision of a publicly accessible State aid Register
and Scoreboard by July 2001. In its 2001 Broad Economic Policy Guidelines7, the
Commission repeated this need to reduce overall state aid and to increase transparency. It
recommended that Member States should reduce the overall level of State aid in relation
to GDP by 2003 and redirect it away from ad hoc and sectorial aids and increase the
transparency of State aid policies.
1 SN 401/1/96 Annex II, page 3.
2 00150/98 point 17.
3 248th Council-Internal Market-16 March 2000, Conclusions, point 20.
4 SN 100/1/100 point 17.
5 COM(2000) 214 final dated 4th April 2000, point 3.6iii.
6 SN 100/01 point 20 and 21.
7 COM(2001) 224 final dated 25th April 2001, point 3.4ii.
7In order to assess the possibility of reducing the distortive effect on competition in the
Internal Market caused by the cumulative effect of overall State aid levels, Member
States should ascertain their room for manoeuvre in the choice of the most appropriate
Government intervention. State aid is essentially justified to rectify market failures. If
there is a need for intervention, State aid is only one of the possible instruments that may
be used and which also include regulation, direct government provision of certain goods
or services, taxation, etc. There may, therefore, be situations where Member States could
use measures other than State aid and that are more adapted to the objective pursued.
Action based on an improved assessment of the effectiveness and the efficiency of State
aid policies could enhance the functioning of the Internal Market. It might also lead to
the improved targeting of State aid and a shift away from State aid to better-suited and
less distortive instruments thereby reinforcing the current downward trend of overall aid
in relation to GDP.
Member States’ State aid policy is influenced by a combination of factors, both at the
Community and the national levels. The former includes the requirements linked to
economic policy co-ordination, the budgetary criteria of the Stability and Growth Pact,
the co-financing priorities within the Community regional policy. The latter respond to
national specificities which may change over time. Some Member States might have to
concentrate aid on regional policy objectives for reasons of economic and social
cohesion, whilst others, during a certain period of time, have to face massive
restructuring in particular sectors. Some Member States might not need to grant as much
State aid as others to support SMEs if their regulatory environment and capital markets
already facilitate conditions for the development of those firms.
The different needs of Member States to rely on State aid in terms of the overall amount
as well as for various objectives have to be discussed openly. Such an open discussion
will allow to fully appreciate the room for manoeuvre to choose the most efficient
economic policy instrument and thus also the potential to reduce the distortive effect on
competition in the internal market. In order to generate this wider debate and an
accelerated exchange of experience between the Member States, Commissioner Monti
initiated two new tools to increase transparency on State aid issues: a State aid Register,
already available on the Union’s Internet server EUROPA8, and the present State aid
Scoreboard.
8 http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/state_aid/register/
82. STRUCTURE, CONTENTS, DEVELOPMENT AND LIMITATIONS OF THE STATE
AID SCOREBOARD
2.1. Structure and Contents
The Scoreboard is a transparent and publicly accessible source of information on the
overall State aid situation in the European Union and on the Commission's current State
aid control activities. The Scoreboard is shared with Member States and will benefit from
their contributions. This first edition comprises a series of indicators that describe
different State aid situations. This first version of the Scoreboard asks questions rather
than answering them. It points out differences, but does not necessarily explain them.
The questions raised and the differences described will certainly be a thorough basis for
discussion between the Member States and the Commission, but also, it is hoped,
between the Member States themselves. It will raise awareness on State aid matters and
will, not least, increase the often lacking understanding for the necessity of the
Commission's State aid control.
The present Scoreboard consists of five parts: an overview of State aid in the European
Union over the last ten years and in the recent past, a Member State forum, procedural
performance in the European Union, current State aid policy and, State aid in the Internal
Market. In addition, a technical annex presents the underlying data for each graph and
table. Figures presented in the Scoreboard and annex are expressed in constant 1998
values.
The first part of the present Scoreboard shows State aid expenditure in the Union since
1990 expressed as a percentage of GDP and in absolute values. Overall aid expressed as
a percentage of GDP in each Member State for the period 1997, 1998 and 1999 are also
given. The shares of aid are then given according to the main purposes pursued: fostering
horizontal objectives like research and development, small and medium-sized enterprises,
environmental protection and energy saving or training and employment, helping
agriculture and fisheries, assisting the transport sector, aiding other specific sectors like
coal mining, shipbuilding or steel production, supporting regions that lag behind. This
breakdown is followed by a more detailed breakdown of the horizontal objectives into
their main constituent parts.
The second part provides seminal ideas for a Member State forum that will offer
information on their levels of transparency and should act as a catalyst for discussion
between Member States.
In the third part, an indication of Member States’ success in complying with procedural
rules is given in order to identify problems and therefore indicate where improvements
might be necessary. In addition, information on the recovery of illegally granted State aid
is included.
With a view to identifying possible areas where future action by the Commission under
State aid rules might be necessary or desirable, the fourth part of the Scoreboard
highlights some issues and situates Member States accordingly. The Member States are
encouraged to discuss certain spending trends and patterns that might have a positive
impact upon the functioning of the Internal Market.
9The final part of the Scoreboard attempts to situate State aid in the broader context of the
Internal Market and the structural reforms undertaken by the Member States. State aid,
even if complying with EC competition policy rules, affect, among others, the
competitive process in the Internal Market, economic policy co-ordination and the
adjustment of the EU economy to new competitive conditions. In light of the broader
implications of State aid and beyond the mere respect of EC competition rules, Member
States may wish to consider re-evaluating their State aid policies for reasons of economic
effectiveness and efficiency.
2.2. Development
The Scoreboard will be developed gradually in response to the needs of its various future
user constituencies. It will be based on a core set of indicators that will, over time,
demonstrate policy shifts and State aid spending patterns. These core indicators will be
accompanied in each Scoreboard by other indicators that will focus on certain topics for
deeper analysis. The Scoreboard will also be developed with a view to add value to other
Commission documents, in particular the proposals for Broad Economic Policy
Guidelines, Structural Indicators and Benchmarking Enterprise Policy. The concept
behind the initial structure is essentially to propose the direction in which the Scoreboard
will develop in future.
2.3. Limitations
State aid data collected for the Scoreboard are grouped according to primary objectives.
It has to be noted that primary objectives cannot always give a completely accurate
picture of the final beneficiaries: e.g. a part of regional aid is in fact paid to small and
medium size enterprises, aid for R&D goes to particular sectors, and so on.
Throughout the Scoreboard a series of indicators is presented. It has to be underlined that
the purpose of these indicators is to highlight factual developments, without attempting
to establish causal links. In this way, the Scoreboard does not make judgements but is
offering factual data, which allow to start discussions without prejudging their outcome.
It is important to keep this limitation in mind when using the Scoreboard data.
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3. OVERVIEW OF STATE AID IN THE EUROPEAN UNION
This chapter gives an overview on aid granted in the European Union since 1990 and
shows the changing patterns of State aid granted to agriculture and fisheries, railways
and, the manufacturing, coal and service sectors. A breakdown of aid granted to the
manufacturing and service sectors and of aid that supports certain horizontal objectives is
also given.
3.1. Stockholm indicator – Movement in a downward direction
The EU level of overall State aid expressed as a percentage of GDP has been coming
down over the years after having peaked in 1993. With the latest data indicating an aid
level of 1% of EU GDP, there may still be some room for further decreases in future. The
Member States have agreed in 2001 in Stockholm to use this room for further decreases.
Graph 1: Long term decrease in the overall level of State aid as a percentage of EU
GDP 1990-1999
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Graph 2: State aid expressed as a percentage of GDP dropped in most Member
States between 1997 and 1999.
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From 1997 to 1999 overall aid expressed as a percentage of GDP dropped in the majority
of Member States. Slight increases are only seen in Denmark, Ireland, Luxembourg and
the Netherlands.
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Graph 3: Steady decrease in aid granted to the manufacturing, coal and service
sectors since 1993
Expressed in million Euro in constant 1998 values, absolute amounts of aid granted in
the EU have dropped by over 20% from the 1993 peak. This drop is all the more
important when one considers that since 1995, the Union comprised fifteen Member
States. The largest decrease has been seen in levels of aid granted to the manufacturing,
coal and service sectors.
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3.2. Focus on manufacturing, coal and services
At the Lisbon European Council in 2000, Member States subscribed to the need to tackle
horizontal objectives of common interest such as employment, environment, training or
research and regional development. The Scoreboard will therefore concentrate on these
objectives in the context of the manufacturing, coal and service sectors.
Large parts of the agricultural and fisheries sector traditionally receive substantial
support from the Community budget. A separate analysis will be made in future
Scoreboards.
State aid for railway transport is usually granted to undertakings that perform a public
service obligation. Despite the different nature of aid granted for public service
obligations, it constitutes, according to recent Court decisions, State aid. An analysis of
aid to this sector will be considered in future.
Aid to the Agricultural, Fisheries and Railway transport is therefore not included
hereafter in this chapter.
Graph 4: Share of aid granted for horizontal and regional objectives and to specific
sectors as a percentage of overall aid in the EU, less aid to agriculture, fisheries and
railway transport
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Graph 4 shows a gradual shift in the share of aid away from specific manufacturing, coal
and service sectors towards horizontal aid. Moreover the sharp drop in 1999 of the share
of aid destined to specific sectors - mainly steel, shipbuilding, some other manufacturing
sectors, coal mining, air transport, tourism, financial services, media and culture - was
matched by a significant increase in the shares of aid granted for horizontal objectives -
research and development, environmental protection and energy saving, small and
medium sized companies, employment and training.
14
3.3. Gradual changes in patterns of support granted to horizontal aid
Most categories of horizontal aid are considered as having the potential to create benefits
that are greater than their cost measured in terms of aid amounts alone. Strictly speaking
aid for rescue and restructuring is also a horizontal aid as it is not limited per se to any
particular economic activity or geographic area. Nevertheless this type of aid has a
greater potential for distorting competition than other horizontal aid and is considered
separately.
Graph 5: Gradual changes in the pattern of horizontal aid objectives in the
European Union since 1990
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Over close to a decade the shares of aid for research and development and to a lesser
extent, environmental protection and energy saving increased their relative importance
whilst the share of aid for SMEs has remained stable.
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4. MEMBER STATE FORUM
4.1. Member States' provision of information on state aid
An important component of a peer review process that the Commission wishes to
encourage by way of the Scoreboard is a transparent exchange of information between
Member States on various aspects of their respective State aid/Competition policies. The
Scoreboard is therefore designed to provide links to relevant Internet sites operated by or
on behalf of the Member States. In this way the profile of information already provided
to the public by Member States on their aid policies should be increased.
Each Member State will gradually provide further information on relevant Internet
addresses where information on national competition activities is available.
For the time being the addresses below provide access to information and reports on
State aid, subsidies and competition issues that have been published in Germany, Italy
and the UK by the Bundesministerium der Finanzen, Ministero delle Attività Produttive
and the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) respectively.
– http://dip.bundestag.de/btd/14/015/1401500.pdf
– http://www.minindustria.it/dgcii/Relazione/relazione.htm
– http://www.dti.gov.uk/opportunityforall/indicators2/index.htm
4.2. Member States' vision of the future thrust of national state aid policies
To add a further dimension to information on national activities, Member States provide
details on official sources of information that provide an indication of current thinking on
the development of national State aid policies. In this context documents on budgetary
planning of the Member States typically provide an initial impression on future
developments of aid policies.
The UK has indicated the following addresses:
http://www.dti.gov.uk/europe/stateaid/index.htm
This address gives information from the Department of Trade and Industry on State aid.
http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/docs/2001/enterprise_1806.html
This address provides a link to a joint HM Treasury/DTI document that is mainly about
reforms to the UK competition regime and in addition is linked to the EU competition
agenda, including comments about State aid.
Budgetary planning of Germany for the period of 2001 to 2005:
http://www.bundesfinanzministerium.de/fach/abteilungen/bundhaus/bhh2002.pdf (see
page 10 of the document).
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As regards Finland, the Business Aid (General Conditions) Act of 1998 is given as an
example. Under the Act, business aid (excluding agriculture and fisheries) must be
allocated primarily to correct market shortcomings. At the same time the Act stipulates
that the business aid programmes must be drawn up in such a way that they have as little
effect as possible in terms of distorting competition. Another central feature is that the
Act also requires the authorities to evaluate the attainment and effectiveness of the
objectives laid down for the aid programmes in order to identify whether the aid is
necessary and where it may need to be developed.
For the purpose of the Scoreboard, contact data for all the bodies involved in supervising
and granting State aid, along with descriptions of the national projects on this subject will
be provided in future.
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5. PROCEDURAL PERFORMANCE IN THE EUROPEAN UNION
5.1. Procedural performance
The Commission controls the Member States’ granting of State aid by means of a formal and
transparent procedure, Council regulation No 659/1999. In the following six graphs, three
indicators are used to illustrate Member States’ compliance with the state aid control
procedure in all sectors except agriculture, fisheries, railway transport and coal (See technical
annex for details).
Graph 6 shows the share of investigated aid cases for which, contrary to the procedural
provisions, not the Member State, but the Commission had to initiate the control procedure
after having found out about the aid, for example following a complaint. The share in the total
number of registered aid cases, of these so-called non-notified aids hints to differing degrees
of the correct understanding of the notion of State aid, to differences in the complexity of
cases and may also indicate administrative difficulties that the Member States may encounter
when applying the state aid rules.
Graph 6: Aid cases investigated but not notified to the Commission as percentage of all
cases registered in the years 1997, 1998 and 1999
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The following graph gives a breakdown of the above information by Member State.
Graph 7: Aid cases investigated but not notified to the Commission as percentage of all
cases registered from 1997 until 1999. Breakdown by Member State.
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In Germany, Greece, Italy and the UK, the proportion of non-notified cases are equal to or
greater than the EU average.
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Graph 8: Share in overall number of cases decided after the opening of the formal
investigation procedure in the years 1997, 1998 and 1999
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Where the Commission has doubts whether certain aid measures comply with State aid rules,
it carries out a formal investigation during which third parties and all Member States are
invited to provide observations. In most of the cases, the Commission has, however, no doubt
on the compatibility with the State aid rules and allows Member States to award such aid
without carrying out a formal investigation procedure. It only opens this procedure, when
doubts exist. Graph 8 shows the share of these doubtful cases, i.e. which were only decided
upon after the formal investigation procedure, as a percentage of all final decisions taken
between 1.1.1997 and 31.12.1999. Graph 8 also shows that whilst the number of decisions
taken on aid by the Commission decreased from 1997 to 1999, the actual number of formal
investigations has steadily gone up during the same period thus indicating an increasing share
of complex cases.
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The following graph gives a breakdown by Member State of the above information.
Graph 9: Proportion of overall number of cases decided after the opening of the formal
investigation procedure during the period 1997 until 1999. Breakdown by Member State
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The proportion of aid decisions only taken after a formal investigation procedure is above the
EU average in Germany, Greece, France, Italy and Luxembourg.
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When, at the end of the formal investigation procedure, the Commission comes to the
conclusion that the examined aid does not comply with State aid rules and hence is not
compatible with the Common Market, it takes a negative decision.
The following graph 10 shows the share of incompatible and compatible aid cases that have
been examined by the Commission. The total number of decisions between 1.1.1997 and
31.12.1999, are broken down into negative and positive decisions, the latter sometimes only
being made under certain conditions. The share of such conditional decisions in the overall
number of decisions did not exceed 2% in this period.
Graph 10: Compatibility indicator for the EU in the years 1997, 1998, 1999
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In 1997, four conditional Commission decisions were taken on cases from Germany, Italy and
France. In 1998, eight such decisions were taken on cases from Austria, Germany, Italy and
France and, in 1999, a further three conditional decisions were taken on cases from Germany,
Italy and the Netherlands.
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The following graph gives a breakdown by Member State of the above information.
Graph 11: Compatibility indicator during the period 1997 until 1999. Breakdown by
Member State
6 2 3 9 13 6 8 6 8
33
1 2 6
94 98 97
91 87 94 100
92 94 92
67
99 100 100 98 94
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
A
(65)
B
(45)
DK
(35)
D
(361)
EL
(23)
E
(149)
FIN
(23)
F
(73)
IRL
(18)
I
(182)
L
(3)
NL
(90)
P
(37)
S
(28)
UK
(58)
EU
(1190)
Number in brackets: Total number of decisions per Member State
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
Negative decisions Positive and conditional decisions
The share of negative decisions for Germany, Greece, France, Italy and Luxembourg is above
the EU average.
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5.2. Recovery of State aid
When the Commission comes to the conclusion that an aid is not compatible with the EC
Treaty, it takes a negative decision and, as a general rule, orders the Member State to recover
aid from the beneficiary if the aid has already been awarded.
The following table shows for the last ten years the number and distribution of Commission
decisions ordering the recovery of aid in sectors other than agriculture and fisheries.
Table 1: Recovery decisions in the years 1990-1999 for sectors except agriculture and
fisheries
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Manufacturing
and Services
5 4 5 3 1 6 13 10 26 24
Transport - - - 1 1 2 1 2 1 -
Total 5 4 5 4 2 8 14 12 27 24
The following table shows for the same sectors the number of recovery orders the execution
of which is still pending at the end of the year 2000. It also indicates the share of recovered
cases where legal procedures are pending or which are subject to a bankruptcy procedure.
Table 2: Recovery orders pending at 31.12.2000 in sectors other than agriculture and
fisheries
In process of
execution
Forming part of
bankruptcy
procedures
Currently object
of National court
procedures
Currently object
of European court
procedures
Total number
pending
31 11 5 20 67
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6. STATE AID OBJECTIVES
This chapter deals with the State aid objectives outside of aid granted to the agricultural,
fisheries and rail transport sectors.
6.1. State aid for horizontal objectives
State aid for horizontal objectives, i.e. aid that is not targeted towards specific sectors or
geographic areas, is usually considered as being less distortive than sectorial and ad hoc aid,
such as aid for rescue and restructuring. The possibility to grant aid horizontally to all sectors
implies that it has a less selective effect than the other kinds of aid. Its positive effect in
addressing market failures is therefore more likely to outweigh its negative impact on
competition.
During the Lisbon and Stockholm European Council, Member States agreed to the
importance of redirecting aid towards horizontal objectives of common interest. Research and
development, safeguarding the environment and energy saving and supporting small and
medium-sized enterprises are the most prominent horizontal objectives pursued with State aid.
The following graph shows the Member States' efforts by way of State aid that is granted
specifically to attain these objectives. Until such time that State aid data can be classified
according to objectives and final impact, aid also supporting these goals but actually granted
for other primary objectives, regional aid for example, cannot be included. However there is a
very unequal distribution of aid that specifically supports horizontal objectives and in many
Member States the reorientation requested in Stockholm will have to be a priority objective
for national State aid policy. Nevertheless, with only few exceptions, the development over
time is clearly going in the direction desired by the European Council.
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Graph 12: Levels of State aid granted specifically to R&D, SMEs, Environmental
protection and Energy saving as a percentage of total aid less aid to agriculture, fisheries
and railway transport 1997, 1998 and 1999
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
A B DK D EL E FIN F IRL I L NL P S UK EU
a
s
a
pe
rc
en
ta
ge
o
ft
o
ta
la
id
le
ss
A
gr
ic
u
ltu
re
,
Fi
sh
er
ie
s
a
n
d
R
a
ilw
a
ys
1997 1998 1999
26
6.2. State aid for regional objectives
Regional aid is also considered to be generally less distortive than aid directed to specific
sectors or ad hoc aid. It is also considered to be an acceptable tool for improving cohesion in
the European Union. Consequently, the Stockholm Council also asked the Member States to
redirect State aid in support of cohesion objectives.
The impact on regional economies of using State aid to tackle regional problems can be
illustrated by the following graph 13. With the exception of Luxembourg where a breakdown
of GDP by assisted region is not available, this graph expresses regional aid as a percentage
of GDP of assisted regions. It has to be stressed that in addition to such regional aid, the
Community also awards support to projects that are financed jointly with Member States.
However, Community funding is not included here.
Graph 13: Regional state aid as a percentage of GDP of assisted regions from 1996 to
1998
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Apart from the quite important differences amongst the Member States that are shown in this
graph, it appears that Member States are either reducing levels of regional state aid or
maintaining a relatively low but stable level of regional aid. Of the four “cohesion countries”,
Spain and Ireland have in 1997, relatively low levels of regional aid, whilst in both Greece
and Portugal, between 1997 and 1998, regional aid levels appear to be decreasing rapidly.
Information on maximum aid intensities allowable in each Member State in 1999 is provided
under:
http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/state_aid/regional/
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6.3. State aid for specific sectors
Aid to support specific sectors is likely to distort competition to a larger degree than aid that
is directed towards the horizontal objectives discussed in paragraph 6.1. Aid destined to coal
mining and specific manufacturing sectors is mainly directed either to declining industries in
order to attenuate the social repercussions of structural change or, unfair price competition on
the world shipbuilding market. In contrast the bulk of aid that is directed towards specific
service sectors favours those areas of activity that are continually growing in importance, such
as tourism or, sectors that have recently been liberalised such as air transport and financial
services. Graph 14 displays the relative size of State aid granted to these sectors in
comparison to aid given to coal mining and the manufacturing sector.
Graph 14: State aid to specific sectors as a percentage of total aid less aid to agriculture,
fisheries and railway transport, 1990-1999
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Manufacturing includes steel, shipbuilding and other manufacturing sectors. Services include
the media, culture, tourism, financial and air transport sectors.
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6.4. State aid for rescuing and restructuring companies
The graphs presented in the preceding paragraphs on horizontal and regional aid reflect
differences between Member States' aid policies based on medium and long-term policy
objectives. A more complete picture has to take account of Member States' other necessities,
which are often found in rescue and restructuring of ailing companies. The bulk of rescue and
restructuring aid is granted ad hoc.
Aid for rescuing and restructuring companies is more likely to distort competition than aid
directed towards the above-mentioned horizontal objectives. Consequently, such ad hoc aid
should not be granted to attain long-term State aid policy objectives, but rather for temporary
and diminishing needs.
Graph 15: Rescue and restructuring aid in different sectors as a percentage of total aid
less agriculture, fisheries and railway transport, 1990-1999
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Graph 15 above displays State aid granted in the European Union for rescue and restructuring
in different sectors during the years 1990 until 1999. The graph reflects the different
restructuring cycles that have been followed in the Union over the past ten years to address
the various needs of those economic sectors where restructuring has been needed most.
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7. STATE AID POLICY IN THE INTERNALMARKET
7.1. Reduction of State aid dispersion between the Member States
At the Stockholm Council Member States were called upon to demonstrate a downward trend
in State aid in relation to GDP by 2003. This has to be placed in the context of alignment of
economic policies within the Internal Market. The following graph 16 shows the diminishing
EU annual level of State aid during the last ten years, expressed as a percentage of GDP, to
the manufacturing, coal mining and service sectors. It furthermore illustrates that the
differences of State aid award amongst Member States, i.e. the range between the highest and
lowest level of aid in terms of GDP are striking.
Graph 16: Dispersion of total aid less aid to agriculture, fisheries and railway transport
as percentage of GDP in the EU 1990-1999
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Expressed as a percentage of GDP, in 1990 and 1991 Italy granted the highest amount of aid
whilst the Netherlands granted the lowest. During the period from 1992 to 1994 Germany
granted, particularly to the new German Bundesländer, relatively high amounts of aid as a
percentage of GDP whilst in the UK and the Netherlands, aid levels remained the lowest in
the Union. Since 1994 the Netherlands have consistently granted the lowest level of aid in the
Union in terms of percentage of GDP.
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7.2. State aid and economic policy co-ordination
EU State aid control is mainly concerned with the distortions of competition caused by State
aid having an impact on trade between Member States. There are however additional reasons
why controlling and containing State aid is important and these relate to the efficiency of
Member States' product markets and the functioning of the Economic and Monetary Union
(EMU).
Efficient product markets and the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines
State aid distorts competition and, whether or not it has an impact on trade between Member
States, may damage the allocative efficiency of the European economy. In particular, it
modifies economic incentives and so may cause the inefficient allocation of scarce private
resources to industries receiving aid and away from others. State aid may also encourage
rent-seeking behaviour and "capture" of government by industries, and moral hazard in the
case of failing industries. Like other government expenditures, the financing of State aid also
raises the issue of the marginal cost of public funds, i.e. the loss of efficiency due to taxation.
The consequences of State aid in terms of inefficient functioning of product markets imply
that the European Commission's control of State aid needs to be supplemented by an effort of
self-discipline on the part of the Member States themselves. In view of the cross-border
spillover effects of State aid, this self-discipline can be more rigorous and politically
acceptable if the efforts of the Member States are co-ordinated. To this end, since 1999
recommendations on State aid are included in the framework of the Broad Economic Policy
Guidelines (BEPG).
The BEPG are at the centre of the process of multilateral surveillance of the economic
policies in the EU, and provide impetus to Member States in the area of structural reforms.
The reduction of State aid has received increasing attention since the Cardiff European
Council of 1998, which highlighted the need to promote competition and to reduce distortions
in product markets. The Commission's Recommendations for the 2001 BEPG continue to put
high priority on containing State aid and Member States are requested to "reduce the overall
level of State aid in relation to GDP by 2003 and redirect it away from ad hoc and sectoral
aids, and increase the transparency of their State aid policies".
Budgetary discipline and the Economic and Monetary Union
In budgetary terms, expenditure on State aid in the EU as shown in graph 17, is not huge
having dropped below 1% of General Government Expenditure in 1999. Nevertheless, State
aid competes for scarce budgetary resources with many other important activities. From the
public finance point of view, this raises the question of determining priorities, given the
constraints imposed on the budget by the politically acceptable level of taxation and the
sustainability of the public debt.
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Graph 17: National aid less aid to agriculture, fisheries and railways in the Member
States from 1997 to 1999 as a percentage of government expenditure
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In particular, within the Economic and Monetary Union, Member States are required to
pursue budgetary discipline with a view of supporting a monetary policy targeted to price
stability. Budgetary discipline avoids the risk of spill-over effects of unsound fiscal policies
and allows Member States to retain enough room of manoeuvre for using their national fiscal
policy to address country-specific circumstances. More recently, sound public finances have
been also associated with the need to prepare for the budgetary consequences of ageing
populations.
The Stability and Growth Pact lays down the basic principles for the conduct of fiscal policy
within the European Monetary Union (EMU). It establishes a comprehensive surveillance and
co-ordination procedure to ensure sustainable public finances and budgetary discipline during
the third stage of EMU.
The provision of State aid therefore takes place within relatively tight budgetary limits, strict
surveillance mechanisms and increasing attention to the quality of public finances. All these
constraints contribute to raising the opportunity cost of government resources, since within
the available spending limits State aid now competes more intensely with other possible uses
of government resources. Member States therefore face an even stronger incentive to monitor
the efficiency of the State aid they grant.
Between 1997 and 1999, increases in State aid as a percentage of Government expenditure are
seen in Belgium, Denmark, Ireland, and Sweden.
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7.3. State aid and structural change
In a changing environment, the competitiveness of firms, industries and nations depends on
their ability to react quickly to new opportunities and challenges: adaptation, as captured by
structural change, is a manifestation of competitiveness. The processes of country or regional
specialisation, of concentration of the industry into some locations and changing sector shares
in the economy are driven, of course, by the decisions of individual firms and investors. The
speed of change depends mainly on economic forces such as changing factor prices,
technology shocks and changing consumer tastes. Open and competitive markets and an
active entrepreneurial culture facilitate change.
The speed of structural change correlates positively with output (GDP) and productivity
growth. In comparison with the US, Europe tends to be slower in adjusting its economy.
In principle, State aid could weigh in favour of structural change by contributing for example,
to an acceleration of workforce adaptation or technology transfer. One of the aims of the
Scoreboard is to measure the contribution of State aid in facilitating structural change.
Even if the use of State aid meets its immediate goals in the context of a region or country,
State aid raises issues with respect to cohesion. Indeed, it might contribute to a slow-down of
economic convergence, if “front runners” mobilise more public aid resources than those
“catching up”.
At the level of the firm, data do not allow addressing questions such as to what extent have
beneficiaries of restructuring State aid succeeded, how many jobs have been maintained and
what was the total opportunity cost of these operations. In view of these difficulties, State aid
for restructuring must be monitored very closely.
Graph 18 below shows the change in the contribution of the manufacturing sector to overall
national GDP and the change in the share of manufacturing aid to total aid less agriculture,
fisheries and railway transport in the years 1990 and 1999. The graph does not show any
correlation between State aid and structural change.
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Graph 18: Relationship between the percentage change in the contribution of the
manufacturing sector to overall national GDP and the change in the share of
manufacturing aid to total aid less aid to agriculture, fisheries and railway transport
between 1990 and 1999
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* Data for Austria, Finland and Sweden only cover the period from 1995 to 1999.
In all Member States the contribution of the manufacturing sector to national GDP has
decreased during the observation period whilst in six Member States, Austria, Belgium,
Germany, Finland, France and Sweden, aid to manufacturing increased its share of total aid
less aid to agriculture, fisheries and railway transport.
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7.4. State aid and competition in the Internal Market
State aid is a powerful public policy instrument which can have a significant impact on
competition conditions within the Internal Market, but it is not the only one. Other regulatory
legal and policy instruments in the hands of public authorities have an impact on the Internal
Market.
An overall assessment of competition conditions in the Internal Market must also take into
account the degree, nature and evolution of public policy intervention on other fronts. The
favourable effects of a progressive reduction in State aid spending may vanish if public
authorities engage in other policies aiming at replacing protectionist subsidies with for
example, non-tariff barriers. On the other hand, a reduction in State aid spending will be more
beneficial in a context of increasingly open, transparent and competitive markets.
It is difficult to capture all the possible legal, regulatory and policy variables in the hands of
public authorities. Table 3 shows State aid and two indicators of market openness related to
trade and inward foreign direct investment. Although they are not the direct result of public
policy intervention only, a positive evolution of these two indicators results in increased
competition due to increasing exposure to foreign competition.
The Table shows that the overall evolution of competitive conditions is positive. In most
countries, State aid reductions are accompanied by increasingly open markets.
Table 3 State aid less agriculture, fisheries and rail transport, Trade openness and FDI,
as a percentage of GDP
Austria 0,27 (5+) 44,09 (6+) 1,1 (11+)
Belgium 0,37 (8-) 100,89 (1+) 12,3 (2+)
Denmark 0,63 (12-) 37,01 (8-) 1,5 (10+)
Germany 0,64 (13+) 28,67 (12+) 2,2 (7+)
Greece 0,37 (7+) 20,44 (15+) 0,9 (12-)
Spain 0,55 (11+) 30,95 (10+) 0,9 (13-)
Finland 0,38 (9+) 35,41 (9+) 2,0 (8+)
France 0,46 (10+) 29,35 (11+) 1,5 (9+)
Ireland 1,01 (15+) 84,57 (3+) 8,4 (5+)
Italy 0,36 (6+) 23,21 (14+) 0,6 (14+)
Luxembourg 0,23 (3+) 100,89 (1+) 12,3 (2+)
The Netherlands 0,17 (1+) 75,42 (4-) 6,5 (6+)
Portugal 0,82 (14+) 48,02 (5+) 0,3 (15-)
Sweden 0,25 (4+) 40,46 (7+) 21,1 (1+)
United Kingdom 0,22 (2+) 24,07 (13-) 9,4 (4+)
EU 15 0,44 + 34 (+) 4,0 (+)
* State aid less agriculture, fisheries and railway transport as percentage of GDP
1999
Trade openness
(Exports plus imports)
as a percentage of GDP
Inward FDI as a
percentage of GDP
1999 1999
State aid* as a
percentage of GDP
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The figure in the parenthesis shows the relative rank of each Member State among the EU 15.
The “+” sign indicates a positive evolution in the indicator whilst a “-” sign shows a negative
evolution. Thus, a “+” sign in State aid as a percentage of GDP indicates a decrease whilst a
“+” sign in Trade openness and FDI indicates an increase.
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Technical annex
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All State aid data refer to the implementation of Commission decisions and not cases that are
still under examination, which once decided upon, may have an effect on historical data. State
aid expenditure is attributed to the year it was made. In cases that result in expenditure over a
number of years, the total amount is attributed to each of the years in which expenditure took
place.
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Graph 1
Source: DG Competition database on State aid expenditure in the Member States. Gross
Domestic Product at market prices taken from the Eurostat database Newcronos.
Remarks: All data are expressed in million Euro at constant 1998 values.
Data:
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Total Stateaid 100.555 95.479 101.321 109.466 105.085 105.066 103.757 98.133 91.863 79.660
AgricultureandFisheries 14.156 14.988 14.709 13.839 13.163 15.467 15.489 15.488 13.328 13.972
Railways 31.342 30.291 30.248 33.981 34.984 35.752 33.868 31.333 32.018 31.263
Manufacturing,Coal andServices 55.057 50.200 56.364 61.646 56.937 53.847 54.399 51.313 46.517 34.424
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
GDP 5.815.768 6.004.973 5.939.115 6.375.439 6.613.255 6.990.420 7.121.262 7.383.993 7.610.830 7.817.449
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Graph 2
Source: DG Competition database on State aid expenditure in the Member States.
Gross Domestic Product at market prices taken from the Eurostat database
Newcronos.
Remarks: All data are expressed in million Euro at constant 1998 values.
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Data:
Overall state aid
1997 1998 1999 1997 1998 1999
A Total state aid 2.304 2.175 2.061 IRL 722 1.133 1.339
Agriculture and Fisheries 1.077 996 905 93 92 354
Railways 649 657 646 142 137 131
Manufacturing, Coal and Services 578 522 511 488 904 854
B Total state aid 3.122 3.117 3.217 I 16.580 13.700 10.537
Agriculture and Fisheries 259 217 278 1.752 1.706 1.675
Railways 2.110 2.093 2.085 5.169 5.035 4.962
Manufacturing, Coal and Services 752 807 854 9.659 6.959 3.900
DK Total state aid 1.531 1.536 1.975 L 162 245 246
Agriculture and Fisheries 261 236 248 35 30 29
Railways 445 362 735 77 163 177
Manufacturing, Coal and Services 825 938 992 49 52 40
D Total state aid 29.089 27.503 23.555 NL 2.935 3.054 3.489
Agriculture and Fisheries 1.839 1.612 1.598 1.531 864 1.121
Railways 10.139 10.262 9.520 772 1.599 1.764
Manufacturing, Coal and Services 17.112 15.629 12.436 632 592 604
H Total state aid 1.608 1.210 1.096 P 2.054 1.331 1.219
Agriculture and Fisheries 181 187 165 318 305 287
Railways 337 478 515 21 20 96
Manufacturing, Coal and Services 1.090 544 416 1.716 1.006 836
E Total state aid 6.307 6.219 5.734 S 1.739 1.899 1.739
Agriculture and Fisheries 1.172 1.151 1.367 321 344 363
Railways 1.577 1.424 1.349 905 996 818
Manufacturing, Coal and Services 3.557 3.644 3.017 512 559 559
FIN Total state aid 2.074 2.060 1.848 UK 8.291 8.121 6.294
Agriculture and Fisheries 1.521 1.530 1.358 1.758 1.265 1.123
Railways 44 41 39 2.867 2.755 2.361
Manufacturing, Coal and Services 509 489 451 3.665 4.101 2.810
F Total state aid 19.617 18.559 15.311 EU 98.133 91.863 79.660
Agriculture and Fisheries 3.369 2.793 3.102 15.488 13.328 13.972
Railways 6.079 5.996 6.065 31.333 32.018 31.263
Manufacturing, Coal and Services 10.168 9.770 6.144 51.313 46.517 34.424
GDP data
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
A 177.523 181.040 183.183 188.452 192.378
B 188.426 192.453 195.883 196.851 202.617 208.403 210.453 217.870 223.749 229.432
DK 125.717 126.725 121.164 125.907 133.841 143.129 146.738 151.336 155.190 157.790
D 1.514.586 1.700.379 1.728.733 1.731.349 1.776.767 1.843.146 1.857.238 1.883.194 1.921.864 1.951.751
EL 90.998 92.784 87.963 94.128 95.189 99.337 101.680 105.249 108.464 112.108
E 435.363 444.973 437.911 444.705 465.343 471.469 482.968 501.967 523.647 544.715
FIN 99.078 103.053 109.539 115.532 120.177
F 1.136.071 1.148.171 1.132.968 1.145.880 1.173.978 1.217.693 1.231.090 1.254.607 1.293.104 1.330.890
IRL 45.073 46.006 45.407 49.893 53.954 59.519 64.098 70.979 77.052 84.627
I 949.534 961.205 938.191 959.746 980.375 1.017.939 1.029.099 1.047.752 1.063.825 1.078.948
L 11.611 12.150 12.456 13.096 14.125 14.141 14.549 15.606 16.389 17.618
NL 273.336 279.615 274.009 285.740 293.774 315.784 325.377 337.875 351.620 365.215
P 77.999 79.772 80.732 82.839 84.535 89.082 92.260 95.693 99.004 101.879
S 199.773 201.925 205.933 212.003 220.023
UK 1.054.774 1.031.437 1.021.678 1.058.651 1.103.984 1.155.568 1.185.038 1.226.739 1.259.035 1.286.225
EU 5.815.768 6.004.973 5.939.115 6.375.439 6.613.255 6.990.420 7.121.262 7.383.993 7.610.830 7.817.449
___________________________________________________________________________
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Graph 3
Source: State aid data are taken from the DG Competition database on State aid
expenditure in the Member States.
Remarks: All data are expressed in million Euro at constant 1998 values.
Data: See table graph 1
___________________________________________________________________________
Graph 4
Source: State aid data are taken from the DG Competition database on State aid
expenditure in the Member States.
Remarks: All data are expressed in million Euro at constant 1998 values.
Data:
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Horizontal objectives 12.488 11.773 13.284 11.132 10.358 11.016 13.319 12.161 12.483 12.675
Other specific sectors 24.071 21.449 21.575 23.707 21.534 19.078 20.229 18.527 17.708 10.484
Regional aid 18.498 16.978 21.505 26.807 25.045 23.753 20.852 20.625 16.326 11.265
Total lessAgriculture,
Fisheries andRailways 55.057 50.200 56.364 61.646 56.937 53.847 54.399 51.313 46.517 34.424
___________________________________________________________________________
Graph 5
Source: State aid data are taken from the DG Competition database on State aid
expenditure in the Member States.
Remarks: All data are expressed in million Euro at constant 1998 values.
Data:
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
ResearchandDevelopment 2.889 3.187 3.636 3.248 3.496 3.672 4.152 4.068 3.750 3.897
Environment andEnergysaving 768 1.019 1.345 1.038 1.184 1.343 1.222 1.226 1.363 1.418
SME 3.070 3.239 3.471 3.112 3.057 3.312 3.718 3.495 3.111 2.926
OtherObjectives 5.358 3.887 4.232 3.152 1.830 1.080 899 744 1.156 983
Employment andTraining 403 441 599 582 791 1.609 3.329 2.629 3.102 3.452
Total 12.488 11.773 13.284 11.132 10.358 11.016 13.319 12.161 12.483 12.675
___________________________________________________________________________
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Methodology used for graphs 6 to 11:
The methodology used is the following: cases and decisions on all sectors have been
examined except for agriculture, fisheries and coal. All final decisions, defined in the
Procedural Council Regulation, 659/99 (0J 83/1 of 27.03.1999), were taken into account
except: ‘appropriate measures’, ‘referral to the Court of Justice or the Council’, ‘linguistic
revision’ and ‘corrigendum of a previous decision’. In order to soften peculiarities when
calculating percentages of small samples a three-year period was chosen for the Member
States.
Source: Reports on Competition policy 1997, 1998 and 1999.
Ratio of non-notified cases to notified cases:
Formula: (Non notified cases / all registered cases, except existing cases) * 100 = X%
Ratio of opening of formal investigation procedures to approval without opening of
formal investigation procedures:
Only final decisions that closed cases within the reported period were considered for the
investigation indicator. The registration of the case or the decision to open the procedure for a
registered case might have been taken prior to the indicated period.
For Luxembourg it has to be noted that the Commission only took three final decisions to
close a formal procedure.
Formula: (positive closing of procedure + negative closing of procedure + conditional closing
of procedure) /(closing of all procedures + approval without opening of procedure) * 100 =
X%
Final decisions to close the formal procedure after withdrawals by the Member State are not
taken into account for this indicator.
Ratio of negative decisions to positive decisions:
In the case of Luxembourg the Commission only took three final decisions on aid measures.
Formula: (negative closing of procedure) /(closing of all procedures + approval without
opening procedure) * 100 = X %
Final decisions to close the formal procedure after withdrawals by the Member State are not
taken into account for this indicator.
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Graph 6
Source: XXVIIth Report on Competition Policy 1997
XXVIIIth Report on Competition Policy 1998
XXIXth Report on Competition Policy 1999
Remarks: The 1999 data differ from the data published in the 1999 Competition
Report because 5 notified cases registered in 1999 have later been split
into 9 additional cases and 1 NN case registered in 1999 has later been
split resulting in 1 additional NN case.
Data on existing cases are only given for information and are not taken
into account for this graph.
Data:
N
(notified cases)
NN
(non notified cases)
E
(existing cases) TOTAL
NN as %
of total
1997 541 152 2 695 21,9
1998 378 107 5 490 21,8
1999 504 106 6 616 17,2
___________________________________________________________________________
Graph 7
Source: XXVIIth Report on Competition Policy 1997
XXVIIIth Report on Competition Policy 1998
XXIXth Report on Competition Policy 1999
The breakdown by Member State has been taken from the Commission's
notifications register.
Remarks: The 1999 data differ from the data published in the 1999 Competition
Report because 5 N cases registered in 1999 have later been split into 9
additional cases and 1 NN case registered in 1999 has later been split
resulting in 1 additional NN case.
Data on existing cases are only given for information and are not taken
into account for this graph.
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Data:
N
(notified cases)
NN
(non notified cases)
E
(existing cases)
NN as %
of to tal
1997 27 6 0 18,2
1998 13 2 0 0,0
1999 34 1 1 2,8
Average 25 3 0 10,7
1997 27 3 0 10,0
1998 22 2 1 0,0
1999 22 6 2 20,0
Average 24 4 1 12,9
1997 20 1 0 4,8
1998 9 4 0 30,8
1999 14 0 0 0,0
Average 14 2 0 10,4
1997 181 75 0 29,3
1998 94 54 2 36,0
1999 124 32 0 20,5
Average 133 54 1 28,6
1997 5 6 0 54,5
1998 7 2 0 22,2
1999 5 0 0 0,0
Average 6 3 0 32,0
1997 53 10 1 15,6
1998 46 8 0 14,8
1999 89 22 0 19,8
Average 63 13 0 17,5
1997 9 0 0 0,0
1998 11 1 0 8,3
1999 14 4 0 22,2
Average 11 2 0 12,8
1997 27 6 0 18,2
1998 25 4 0 13,8
1999 30 7 0 18,9
Average 27 6 0 17,2
1997 4 2 0 33,3
1998 6 1 2 11,1
1999 8 1 0 11,1
Average 6 1 1 16,7
1997 91 21 0 18,8
1998 59 18 0 23,4
1999 79 20 3 19,6
Average 76 20 1 20,3
1997 6 0 0 0,0
1998 0 0 0 0,0
1999 2 0 0 0,0
Average 3 0 0 0,0
1997 45 4 0 8,2
1998 31 2 0 6,1
1999 29 8 0 21,6
Average 35 5 0 11,8
1997 19 3 0 13,6
1998 22 3 0 12,0
1999 9 3 0 25,0
Average 17 3 0 15,3
1997 13 2 0 13,3
1998 11 0 0 0,0
1999 12 1 0 7,7
Average 12 1 0 7,7
1997 15 13 1 44,8
1998 22 6 0 21,4
1999 33 1 0 2,9
Average 23 7 0 22,0
1997 541 152 2 21,9
1998 378 107 5 21,8
1999 504 106 6 17,2
Average 474 122 4 20,3
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Graph 8
Sources: XXVIIth Report on Competition Policy 1997
XXVIIIth Report on Competition Policy 1998
XXIXth Report on Competition Policy 1999
Remarks: The following decision types, defined in the Procedural Regulation,
659/99 (0J 83/1 of 27.03.1999) have not been taken into account for this
table:
- Injunction decisions
- Decisions to open proceedings
- Decisions to close proceedings because of withdrawal
- Appropriate measures to modify existing aid measures
– Referral to the Court of Justice or Council.
Data:
Positive
decision
Conditional
decision
Negative
decision
1997 407 19 6 10 442 7,9 2,3
1998 334 17 8 35 394 15,2 8,9
1999 290 30 3 31 354 18,1 8,8
Closing decisions as
% of total
Approval
without
objections
Closing of proceedings with a: Total
number of
decisions
Negative decisions as
% of total
___________________________________________________________________________
Graph 9
Source: XXVIIth Report on Competition Policy 1997
XXVIIIth Report on Competition Policy 1998
XXIXth Report on Competition Policy 1999
The breakdown by Member State has been taken from the Commission's
notifications register.
Remarks: The following decision types, according to the Procedural Regulation
659/99 (0J 83/1 of 27.03.1999), have not been taken into account for this
table:
- Injunction decisions
- Decisions to open proceedings
- Decisions to close proceedings because of withdrawal- Appropriate
measures to modify existing aid measures
- Referral to the Court of Justice or Council
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Data:
P o s i t iv e
d e c i s io n
C o n d i t io n a l
d e c i s io n
N e g a t iv e
d e c i s io n
1 9 9 7 2 8 0 0 1 3 , 4 3 ,4
1 9 9 8 1 8 0 1 3 1 8 ,2 1 3 ,6
1 9 9 9 1 4 0 0 0 0 , 0 0 ,0
A v e r a g e 2 0 ,0 0 ,0 0 ,3 1 ,3 7 , 7 6 ,2
1 9 9 7 1 2 0 0 0 0 , 0 0 ,0
1 9 9 8 2 0 0 0 1 4 , 8 4 ,8
1 9 9 9 1 1 1 0 0 8 , 3 0 ,0
A v e r a g e 1 4 ,3 0 ,3 0 ,0 0 ,3 4 , 4 2 ,2
1 9 9 7 1 8 0 0 1 5 , 3 5 ,3
1 9 9 8 1 0 0 0 0 0 , 0 0 ,0
1 9 9 9 6 0 0 0 0 , 0 0 ,0
A v e r a g e 1 1 ,3 0 ,0 0 ,0 0 ,3 2 , 9 2 ,9
1 9 9 7 1 4 4 5 2 4 7 , 1 2 ,6
1 9 9 8 9 2 8 1 1 5 2 0 ,7 1 2 ,9
1 9 9 9 6 2 1 3 1 1 4 3 1 ,1 1 5 ,6
A v e r a g e 9 9 ,3 8 ,7 1 ,3 1 1 , 0 1 7 ,5 9 ,1
1 9 9 7 4 1 0 0 2 0 ,0 0 ,0
1 9 9 8 8 1 0 1 2 0 ,0 1 0 ,0
1 9 9 9 5 1 0 2 3 7 ,5 2 5 ,0
A v e r a g e 5 , 7 1 ,0 0 ,0 1 ,0 2 6 ,1 1 3 ,0
1 9 9 7 3 9 4 0 1 1 1 ,4 2 ,3
1 9 9 8 2 9 1 0 5 1 7 ,1 1 4 ,3
1 9 9 9 6 5 2 0 3 7 , 1 4 ,3
A v e r a g e 4 4 ,3 2 ,3 0 ,0 3 ,0 1 0 ,7 6 ,0
1 9 9 7 8 0 0 0 0 , 0 0 ,0
1 9 9 8 7 0 0 0 0 , 0 0 ,0
1 9 9 9 7 1 0 0 1 2 ,5 0 ,0
A v e r a g e 7 , 3 0 ,3 0 ,0 0 ,0 4 , 3 0 ,0
1 9 9 7 2 7 2 2 1 1 5 ,6 3 ,1
1 9 9 8 1 7 2 2 2 2 6 ,1 8 ,7
1 9 9 9 1 3 2 0 3 2 7 ,8 1 6 ,7
A v e r a g e 1 9 ,0 2 ,0 1 ,3 2 ,0 2 1 ,9 8 ,2
1 9 9 7 3 0 0 0 0 , 0 0 ,0
1 9 9 8 2 0 0 1 3 3 ,3 3 3 ,3
1 9 9 9 1 1 1 0 0 8 , 3 0 ,0
A v e r a g e 5 , 3 0 ,3 0 ,0 0 ,3 1 1 ,1 5 ,6
1 9 9 7 4 7 5 2 2 1 6 ,1 3 ,6
1 9 9 8 4 9 2 4 5 1 8 ,3 8 ,3
1 9 9 9 5 0 7 1 8 2 4 ,2 1 2 ,1
A v e r a g e 4 8 ,7 4 ,7 2 ,3 5 ,0 1 9 ,8 8 ,2
1 9 9 7 1 0 0 0 0 , 0 0 ,0
1 9 9 8 1 0 0 1 5 0 ,0 5 0 ,0
1 9 9 9 0 0 0 0 0 , 0 0 ,0
A v e r a g e 0 , 7 0 ,0 0 ,0 0 ,3 3 3 ,3 3 3 ,3
1 9 9 7 3 3 1 0 0 2 , 9 0 ,0
1 9 9 8 3 5 1 0 1 5 , 4 2 ,7
1 9 9 9 1 7 1 1 0 1 0 ,5 0 ,0
A v e r a g e 2 8 ,3 1 ,0 0 ,3 0 ,3 5 , 6 1 ,1
1 9 9 7 1 4 1 0 0 6 , 7 0 ,0
1 9 9 8 1 4 1 0 0 6 , 7 0 ,0
1 9 9 9 7 0 0 0 0 , 0 0 ,0
A v e r a g e 1 1 ,7 0 ,7 0 ,0 0 ,0 5 , 4 0 ,0
1 9 9 7 6 0 0 0 0 , 0 0 ,0
1 9 9 8 1 3 1 0 0 7 , 1 0 ,0
1 9 9 9 8 0 0 0 0 , 0 0 ,0
A v e r a g e 9 , 0 0 ,3 0 ,0 0 ,0 3 , 6 0 ,0
1 9 9 7 2 3 0 0 0 0 , 0 0 ,0
1 9 9 8 1 9 0 0 0 0 , 0 0 ,0
1 9 9 9 1 4 1 0 1 1 2 ,5 6 ,3
A v e r a g e 1 8 ,7 0 ,3 0 ,0 0 ,3 3 , 4 1 ,7
1 9 9 7 4 0 7 1 9 6 1 0 7 , 9 2 ,3
1 9 9 8 3 3 4 1 7 8 3 5 1 5 ,2 8 ,9
1 9 9 9 2 9 0 3 0 3 3 1 1 8 ,1 8 ,8
A v e r a g e 3 4 3 ,7 2 2 ,0 5 ,7 2 5 , 3 1 3 ,4 6 ,4
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Graph 10
Source: XXVIIth Report on Competition Policy 1997
XXVIIIth Report on Competition Policy 1998
XXIXth Report on Competition Policy 1999
Remarks: The following decision types, according to the Procedural Regulation,
have not been taken into account for this table:
- Injunction decisions- Decisions to open proceedings
- Decisions to close proceedings because of withdrawal
- Appropriate measures to modify existing aid measures
- Referral to the Court of Justice or Council
Data: See data graph 8
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Graph 11
Source: XXVIIth Report on Competition Policy 1997
XXVIIIth Report on Competition Policy 1998
XXIXth Report on Competition Policy 1999
The breakdown by Member State has been taken from the Commission's
notifications register.
Remarks: The following decision types, according to the Procedural Regulation,
have not been taken into account for this table:
- Injunction decisions
- Decisions to open proceedings
- Decisions to close proceedings because of withdrawal
- Appropriate measures to modify existing aid measures
- Referral to the Court of Justice or Council
Data: See data graph 9
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Table 1
Source: DG Competition and DG Transport and Energy
Data:
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Manufacturing
and services
5 4 5 3 1 6 13 10 26 24
Transport 0 0 0 1 1 2 1 2 1 0
Total 5 4 5 4 2 8 14 12 27 24
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Table 2
Source: DG Competition and DG Transport and Energy
Data:
In process of
execution
Forming part of
bankruptcy
procedures
Currently object
of National court
procedures
Currently object
of European court
procedures
Total number
pending
31 11 5 20 67
___________________________________________________________________________
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Graph 12
Source: DG Competition database on State aid expenditure in the Member States.
Remarks: All data are expressed in million Euro at constant 1998 values.
Data:
1997 1998 1999 1997 1998 1999
R&D 177 155 146 14 10 13
Environmental protection 50 55 55 0 0 0
SME 88 62 53 5 3 4
Energy saving 4 1 2 3 2 5
Total of the above 318 274 255 21 16 22
Total aid less agriculture, fisheries and railways 578 522 511 488 904 854
R&D 129 99 148 340 186 306
Environmental protection 2 10 5 11 21 15
SME 110 127 213 820 599 647
Energy saving 1 1 0 45 15 21
Total of the above 240 236 366 1.216 822 988
Total aid less agriculture, fisheries and railways 752 807 854 9.659 6.959 3.900
R&D 163 166 157 3 4 6
Environmental protection 223 259 248 2 2 2
SME 24 7 8 8 11 11
Energy saving 138 140 162 0 0 0
Total of the above 549 571 575 13 17 19
Total aid less agriculture, fisheries and railways 825 938 994 49 52 40
R&D 1.206 1.260 1.239 141 152 149
Environmental protection 129 142 114 80 93 74
SME 1.415 1.328 1.061 21 20 24
Energy saving 153 152 148 187 155 151
Total of the above 2.902 2.881 2.563 430 420 398
Total aid less agriculture, fisheries and railways 17.112 15.629 12.436 632 592 604
R&D 0 0 0 13 12 12
Environmental protection 0 0 2 0 0 0
SME 0 23 17 10 26 32
Energy saving 0 0 0 11 8 8
Total of the above 0 24 19 33 46 52
Total aid less agriculture, fisheries and railways 1.090 544 416 1.716 1.006 836
R&D 234 200 219 88 98 81
Environmental protection 15 15 19 30 101 148
SME 244 257 220 44 41 27
Energy saving 23 25 27 26 23 39
Total of the above 516 498 485 188 263 295
Total aid less agriculture, fisheries and railways 3.557 3.644 3.017 512 559 559
R&D 152 157 166 158 105 97
Environmental protection 5 5 7 1 10 9
SME 77 72 59 333 296 280
Energy saving 10 54 57 24 22 22
Total of the above 243 288 288 516 434 408
Total aid less agriculture, fisheries and railways 509 489 451 3.665 4.101 2.810
R&D 1.251 1.145 1.159 4.067 3.750 3.897
Environmental protection 31 30 30 580 744 729
SME 297 238 270 3.495 3.111 2.925
Energy saving 21 21 48 646 619 689
Total of the above 1.600 1.435 1.507 8.788 8.225 8.240
Total aid less agriculture, fisheries and railways 10.168 9.770 6.144 51.313 46.517 34.427
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Graph 13
Source: State aid data have been taken from the DG Competition database on
State aid expenditure in the Member States.
Regional GDP data have been taken from the Eurostat database
Newcronos.
Remarks: Aid data are expressed in million Euro at constant 1998 values.
Regional GDP data have been selected at NUTS 3 level. GDP data for
Italy are only available at NUTS 2 level.
Data:
Regional state aid
1996 1997 1998
Aid under 87(3)a 31 30 31
A Aid under 87(3)c 93 134 141
Total regional aid 124 163 172
B Aid under 87(3)c 258 229 214
DK Aid under 87(3)c 13 15 15
Aid under 87(3)a 8.868 7.165 6.339
D Aid under 87(3)c 742 727 768
Total regional aid 9.609 7.891 7.107
EL Aid under 87(3)a 601 677 447
Aid under 87(3)a 90 85 88
E Aid under 87(3)c 197 219 239
Total regional aid 287 303 327
FIN Aid under 87(3)c 67 63 68
Aid under 87(3)a 506 650 847
F Aid under 87(3)c 766 1.300 1.341
Total regional aid 1.272 1.950 2.188
IRL Aid under 87(3)a 206 197 175
Aid under 87(3)a 6.398 6.548 3.593
I Aid under 87(3)c 127 128 184
Total regional aid 6.524 6.676 3.778
L Aid under 87(3)c 31 35 32
NL Aid under 87(3)c 82 77 71
P Aid under 87(3)a 633 1.187 706
S Aid under 87(3)c 208 185 177
Aid under 87(3)a 210 256 253
UK Aid under 87(3)c 725 719 595
Total regional aid 935 976 849
Aid under 87(3)a 17.543 16.794 12.480
EU Aid under 87(3)c 3.309 3.832 3.845
Total regional aid 20.851 20.625 16.325
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GDP data
1996 1997 1998 1996 1997 1998
total GDP 182363 181819 188723 total GDP 57514 70581 77052
of which of which
total GDP of
assisted regions 50755 50832 53119
total GDP of
assisted regions 57514 70581 77052
Totally assisted regions
under Art. 87.3.a 3907 3879 3995
Totally assisted regions
under Art. 87.3.a 11516 13680 14934
Totally assisted regions
under Art. 87.3.c 13994 14113 14878
Totally assisted regions
under Art. 87.3.c 45998 56901 62118
Partially assisted regions
under Art. 87.3.c 32855 32840 34247
Partially assisted regions
under Art. 87.3.c 0 0 0
Non assisted regions 131608 130987 135604 Non assisted regions 0 0 0
total GDP 211910 215305 223569 total GDP 971065 1028273 1063828
of which of which
total GDP of
assisted regions 137087 138923 144255
total GDP of
assisted regions 950092 1006357 1040762
Totally assisted regions
under Art. 87.3.a 0 0 0
Totally assisted regions
under Art. 87.3.a 209537 223789 231255
Totally assisted regions
under Art. 87.3.c 1283 1301 1351
Totally assisted regions
under Art. 87.3.c 0 0 0
Partially assisted regions
under Art. 87.3.c 135804 137622 142904
Partially assisted regions
under Art. 87.3.c 740555 782569 809508
Non assisted regions 74823 76382 79314 Non assisted regions 20973 21916 23065
total GDP 144155 148586 155191 total GDP 14339 15409 16389
of which of which
total GDP of
assisted regions 57681 59352 61801
total GDP of
assisted regions 14339 15409 16389
Totally assisted regions
under Art. 87.3.a 0 0 0
Totally assisted regions
under Art. 87.3.a 0 0 0
Totally assisted regions
under Art. 87.3.c 11986 12214 12732
Totally assisted regions
under Art. 87.3.c 0 0 0
Partially assisted regions
under Art. 87.3.c 45695 47138 49069
Partially assisted regions
under Art. 87.3.c 14339 15409 16389
Non assisted regions 86474 89234 93390 Non assisted regions 0 0 0
total GDP 1878200 1866496 1921866 total GDP 324479 332654 351621
of which of which
total GDP of
assisted regions 512915 505883 515934
total GDP of
assisted regions 69381 70610 73148
Totally assisted regions
under Art. 87.3.a 214792 211985 214826
Totally assisted regions
under Art. 87.3.a 0 0 0
Totally assisted regions
under Art. 87.3.c 298123 293898 301108
Totally assisted regions
under Art. 87.3.c 11029 11180 11740
Partially assisted regions
under Art. 87.3.c 0 0 0
Partially assisted regions
under Art. 87.3.c 58352 59430 61408
Non assisted regions 1365289 1360615 1405935 Non assisted regions 255095 262046 278469
total GDP 97972 107009 108464 total GDP 88828 93568 99124
of which of which
total GDP of
assisted regions 97973 107010 108465
total GDP of
assisted regions 88828 93568 99125
Totally assisted regions
under Art. 87.3.a 97973 107010 108465
Totally assisted regions
under Art. 87.3.a 51557 54252 57473
Totally assisted regions
under Art. 87.3.c 0 0 0
Totally assisted regions
under Art. 87.3.c 37271 39317 41651
Partially assisted regions
under Art. 87.3.c 0 0 0
Partially assisted regions
under Art. 87.3.c 0 0 0
Non assisted regions 0 0 0 Non assisted regions 0 0 0
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total GDP 480535,6 494672,1 523646,3 total GDP 206273 210815 213702
of which of which
total GDP of
assisted regions 480536 494672 523647
total GDP of
assisted regions 90578 89775 90042
Totally assisted regions
under Art. 87.3.a 232492 237943 250908
Totally assisted regions
under Art. 87.3.a 0 0 0
Totally assisted regions
under Art. 87.3.c 40382 41691 44761
Totally assisted regions
under Art. 87.3.c 20490 20977 21029
Partially assisted regions
under Art. 87.3.c 207662 215038 227977
Partially assisted regions
under Art. 87.3.c 70088 68799 69013
Non assisted regions 0 0 0 Non assisted regions 115695 121040 123660
total GDP 100523 108072 115257 total GDP 929049 1163365 1259035
of which of which
total GDP of
assisted regions 100523 108072 115256
total GDP of
assisted regions 447544 554555 595596
Totally assisted regions
under Art. 87.3.a 10294 10946 11485
Totally assisted regions
under Art. 87.3.a 57735 71435 76434
Totally assisted regions
under Art. 87.3.c 6946 7436 7766
Totally assisted regions
under Art. 87.3.c 21164 26639 28223
Partially assisted regions
under Art. 87.3.c 83284 89690 96005
Partially assisted regions
under Art. 87.3.c 368645 456482 490939
Non assisted regions 0 0 0 Non assisted regions 481506 608810 663440
total GDP 1224606,3 1241129,2 1293104 total GDP 6911813 7277758 7610570
of which of which
total GDP of
assisted regions 737398 749570 783455
total GDP of
assisted regions 3893143 4115169 4298046
Totally assisted regions
under Art. 87.3.a 18120 18306 19137
Totally assisted regions
under Art. 87.3.a 907922 953224 988912
Totally assisted regions
under Art. 87.3.c 75457 76892 80505
Totally assisted regions
under Art. 87.3.c 584122 602558 627862
Partially assisted regions
under Art. 87.3.c 643820 654372 683814
Partially assisted regions
under Art. 87.3.c 2401099 2559387 2681273
Non assisted regions 487208 491560 509649 Non assisted regions 3018670 3162590 3312524
UK
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Graph 14
Source: DG Competition database on State aid expenditure in the Member States.
Remarks: All data are expressed in million Euro at constant 1998 values.
Data:
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Manufacturing 5.423 1.800 1.875 4.051 4.618 4.529 3.002 2.231 2.195 1.478
Services 1.379 3.639 1.596 2.109 3.974 4.553 7.650 6.066 6.921 2.355
Coalmining 17.065 14.925 16.620 15.116 11.190 8.772 7.777 7.924 8.262 6.546
Total sectorial aid 23.867 20.364 20.090 21.275 19.783 17.854 18.430 16.221 17.378 10.378
Total aid less agriculture,
fisheries and railways 55.057 50.200 56.364 61.646 56.937 53.847 54.399 51.313 46.517 34.424
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Graph 15
Source: DG Competition database on State aid expenditure in the Member States.
Remarks: All data are expressed in million Euro at constant 1998 values.
Data:
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Manufacturing 250 1.348 1.902 2.620 1.843 1.224 1.799 2.301 330 107
Steel 2.573 13 555 1.060 1.722 94 338 208 3 0
Shipbuilding 0 47 252 674 1.302 360 1.192 635 1.078 303
Airline services 0 1.991 0 113 2.447 2.390 1.404 1.238 42 0
Financial services 0 0 0 806 514 1.002 4.879 3.246 5.150 939
Total Rescue and Restructuring aid 2.823 3.400 2.709 5.273 7.828 5.070 9.613 7.628 6.604 1.349
Total aid less agriculture, fisheries and
railways 55.057 50.200 56.364 61.646 56.937 53.847 54.399 51.313 46.517 34.424
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Graph 16
Source: State aid data, excluding aid to agriculture, fisheries and railway transport,
taken from DG Competition database on State aid expenditure in the
Member States.
Gross Domestic Product at market price taken from the Eurostat database
Newcronos.
Remarks: All data are expressed in million Euro at constant 1998 values.
Data:
Total state aid less agriculture, fisheries and railway transport.
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
A - - - - - 510 515 578 522 511
B 2.601 3.936 1.508 1.602 1.071 1.009 1.079 752 807 854
DK 432 409 441 691 770 734 846 825 938 992
D 17.460 19.391 25.730 30.835 28.838 20.666 19.031 17.112 15.629 12.436
EL 1.520 1.203 1.279 789 907 1.173 1.021 1.090 544 416
E 2.208 1.924 2.388 2.577 2.343 4.201 3.544 3.557 3.644 3.017
FIN - - - - - 480 398 509 489 451
F 9.342 7.813 9.538 9.391 7.563 5.945 9.075 10.168 9.770 6.144
IRL 397 263 277 421 349 387 447 488 904 854
I 16.115 11.281 11.674 12.946 10.765 12.659 11.657 9.659 6.959 3.900
L 62 76 78 48 47 48 47 49 52 40
NL 681 687 668 507 549 588 678 632 592 604
P 1.094 466 585 680 1.182 872 1.258 1.716 1.006 836
S - - - - - 698 693 512 559 559
UK 3.145 2.751 2.198 1.160 2.553 3.877 4.111 3.665 4.101 2.810
EU 55.057 50.200 56.364 61.646 56.937 53.847 54.399 51.313 46.517 34.424
GDP data: See table graph 2.
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Graph 17
Source: State aid data are taken from the DG Competition database on state aid
expenditure in the Member States.
General Government Expenditure, according to Commission Regulation
(EC) No 1500/2000 with respect to general government expenditure and
revenue (OJ L 172 of 10 July 2000), data are taken from the AMECO
database of DG Economic and Financial Affairs.
Remarks: All data are expressed in million Euro at constant 1998 values.
Data: Total state aid less aid to agriculture, fisheries and railway transport, see
data graph 16.
General government expenditure
1997 1998 1999
A 98.300 102.311 104.105
B 112.680 113.801 115.741
DK 87.985 88.684 88.305
D 927.396 934.240 948.899
EL 47.041 48.327 50.647
E 212.040 218.655 221.588
FIN 62.266 61.522 62.401
F 689.612 698.613 717.175
IRL 26.829 27.432 30.284
I 536.104 528.576 530.776
L 6.760 7.070 7.529
NL 162.958 165.692 169.871
P 42.613 43.768 46.363
S 131.457 130.762 135.890
UK 515.704 512.962 513.473
EU 3.665.214 3.691.825 3.741.739
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Graph 18
Source: Overall total and total manufacturing state aid data have been taken from
the DG Competition database on state aid expenditure. For Austria,
Finland and Sweden Graph 19 only compares the period 1995 - 1999 data.
The gross value added at basic prices - total industry (excluding
construction) - as percentage of GDP has been taken from the Eurostat
database Newcronos. Missing Newcronos data have been completed with
indicators used in the DG Competition database on state aid expenditure.
For Austria, Finland and Sweden Graph 20 only compares the period
1995 - 1999 data.
Remarks: Aid data are expressed in million Euro at constant 1998 values.
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Data:
1990 1995 1999 1990 1995 1999
Total aid 510 511 Total aid 397 854
Manufacturing aid 441 446 Manufacturing aid 334 526
Total aid 2.601 854 Total aid 16.115 3.900
Manufacturing aid 1.243 705 Manufacturing aid 15.665 3.252
Total aid 432 992 Total aid 62 40
Manufacturing aid 358 634 Manufacturing aid 62 36
Total aid 17.460 12.436 Total aid 681 604
Manufacturing aid 6.089 7.537 Manufacturing aid 681 555
Total aid 1.520 416 Total aid 1.094 836
Manufacturing aid 1.518 409 Manufacturing aid 853 180
Total aid 2.208 3.017 Total aid 698 559
Manufacturing aid 1.279 1.120 Manufacturing aid 360 442
Total aid 480 451 Total aid 3.145 2.810
Manufacturing aid 402 402 Manufacturing aid 2.687 1.239
Total aid 9.342 6.144 Total aid 55.057 34.424
Manufacturing aid 5.415 4.109 Manufacturing aid 36.184 21.592
FIN UK
F EU
EL P
E S
DK L
D NL
AU IRL
B I
1990 1995 1999
A 21,8 21,4
B 24,4 20,1
DK 18,3 17,7
D 29,9 23,0
EL 22,4 11,0
E 24,1 20,0
FIN 25,2 23,6
F 21,2 18,9
IRL 27,0 26,7
I 25,0 21,6
L 19,9 12,9
NL 23,8 18,6
P 22,0 19,6
S 23,4 21,8
UK 25,1 20,6
Value added Industry as % of GDP
EU 23,6 21,0
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Table 3
Source: DG Competition database on State aid expenditure in the Member States.
Data on Inward FDI and Trade openness from DG MARKT.
Gross Domestic Product at market price taken from the Eurostat database
Newcronos.
Remarks: GDP data see table graph 2. State aid data see table graph 16.
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